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Abstract 
The 2013 territorial reform of sub-municipal units (SMUs) of government in Portugal 
presents an interesting opportunity to understand the effect of amalgamations on democratic 
outcomes. Like other reforms of its kind, the Portuguese amalgamation reform was triggered 
by economic motivations, aimed at improving local services but seeking mostly to reduce the 
level of public expenditures. Much less relevance was given to the political impacts of 
territorial consolidation. The aim of this research is to assess the impacts of the Portuguese 
territorial reform on political participation measured as voter turnout in SMU elections. We 
use data from five election cycles (2001-2017) to compare turnout levels in amalgamated 
jurisdictions vis-à-vis the ones that did not amalgamate as a result of the process of territorial 
reform. The results of this quasi-experimental design indicate that turnout levels after the 
reform have decreased in the 2013 election and recovered in the 2017 election, but the 




The consequences of municipal amalgamations have been investigated in many countries, 
including Denmark (Blom-Hansen, 2010; Blom-Hansen et al. 2014; Blom-Hansen et al, 
2016), Finland (Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2015), Germany (Blesse and Baskaran, 2016; 
Roesel, 2017), Greece (Chorianopoulos, 2011), Sweden (Hansen, 2014; Hansen et al. 2014), 
Switzerland (Steiner and Kaiser, 2017), Belgium (De Ceuninck et al., 2010), The Netherlands 
(Allers and Geertsema, 2016; Bikker and van der Linde, 2016), and New Zealand (Imran and 
Pearce, 2015; McArthur, 2017). This group of empirical studies focuses primarily on the 
economic, financial and competitiveness effects of amalgamations.  
In contrast, the number of research articles focusing on the political consequences of 
amalgamations is more limited, particularly in terms of the effects of mergers1 on voter 
turnout, but the number of studies has grown in recent years.2. Empirical work has 
documented negative effects of amalgamation for sub-national turnout levels in Austria 
(Styria) (Heinisch et al., 2018), Finland (Lapointe et al., 2015), Germany (Roesel, 2017), 
Israel (Zeedan, 2017), Japan (Horiuchi et al., 2015) and Switzerland (Canton of Ticino) 
(Koch and Rochat, 2017).  
Our study extends this growing body of research in a couple of ways. First, it focuses on the 
political effects of the amalgamation of Portuguese sub-municipal governments, enacted in 
2013 as part of the financial bailout agreement signed by the Portuguese government with 
the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. 
 
1 This article uses the terms ‘amalgamation’, ‘merger’ and ‘territorial consolidation’ interchangeably.  
2 For an in-depth review of the effects of municipal amalgamations, see Tavares (2018). 
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The amalgamation process was implemented in a compulsory manner, reducing the number 
of sub-municipal units (SMUs) by about 1,200 (about 30 percent) and increasing their size 
in an attempt to boost efficiency, seize economies of scale, and reduce the costs of service 
delivery. Local citizens had little influence over the process of deciding which criteria should 
be used and which jurisdictions should be merged. Intuitively, one would expect negative 
political impacts to occur, threatening local identities, political representation, and 
democratic performance. In order to assess the merits of this intuition, this article adopts a 
quasi-experimental design with pre- and post-treatment observations for both an experiment 
and a control group to investigate the effects of the territorial amalgamation of SMUs on 
voter turnout levels.  
Second, we investigate the effects of amalgamations at the sub-municipal level. The 
relevance of ‘the neighborhood’ as a unit of analysis is stressed by Lowndes and Sullivan 
(2008). The authors highlight the civic, social, political, and economic role played by 
neighborhoods in contemporary governance. Although it has been argued that SMUs of 
government in Portugal are similar in size to some of their municipal counterparts in many 
European countries (Tavares and Teles, 2018), the uniqueness of this second tier of local 
government in Portugal places the amalgamation reform in a different context from the 
‘typical’ municipal amalgamation reforms in other European countries. In the Portuguese 
case, the national government provided the legal framework for the reform, but municipal 
assemblies could decide if they chose to, which SMUs to amalgamate, as long as this process 
complied with the criteria defined in the national legal framework (Tavares and Teles, 2018). 
Thus, despite the similarities in size between Portuguese SMUs and municipalities elsewhere 
in Europe (e.g. France) the institutional context of the Reform is significantly different, since 
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the fate of Portuguese SMUs depended upon the decision of both the national and municipal 
governments. 
The article is structured as follows. After this introduction, the second section explores the 
theoretical foundations of the relationship between jurisdiction size, amalgamations and 
voter turnout. Next, we review the empirical literature on the political consequences of 
amalgamations. The fourth section describes the context of the research focusing on the 
amalgamation reform of sub-municipal governments in Portugal and introduces the 
hypotheses to be tested. The fifth section presents the data and methods employed in the 
empirical analysis conducted in section six. The article closes with the discussion of the 
findings, conclusions, and future avenues of research. 
Municipal Amalgamations and Voter Turnout: Theoretical Foundations 
The theoretical debate concerning the effects of municipal amalgamations on voter turnout 
is largely premised on the argument that amalgamations create local government units which 
are ‘too large’ to allow their citizens to effectively express their political preferences through 
the institutions of representative democracy (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Denters et al., 2014). 
This discussion about the relationship between the size of the polity and democracy dates 
back to Ancient Greece. Aristotle argued that a polis should be large enough to be self-
sufficient, but not so large that its citizens are unable to know each other and know what kind 
of people they are (Dagger 1981). 
In the 1967 article ‘The City in the Future of Democracy’, Robert Dahl advanced a solution 
to the size dilemma based in “smaller units within which citizens can from time to time 
formulate and express their desires, consult with officials, and in some cases participate even 
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more fully in decisions.” Smaller units of local government can provide unlimited 
opportunities for participation and are able to foster a sense of unity, integrity, and belonging. 
The 1973 book by Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte, Size and Democracy triggered a stream 
of research to test the arguments linking size to political participation. On one hand, Dahl 
and Tufte readily claim that the motivation of citizens to participate in community affairs is 
maximized in small communities, since a small polity offers a sense of solidarity and greater 
effectiveness in participation. On the other hand, they recognize that larger communities are 
more likely to provide the motivation for citizens to participate in political life, particularly 
matching different groups with different political views. Various empirical works over the 
past few decades have supported the first part of Dahl and Tufte’s argument, finding a 
negative relationship between the size of subnational units and electoral participation at the 
local level (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Oliver 2001, 2012; Frandsen, 2002; Ladner 2002; 
Larsen 2002; Tavares and Carr 2013; Trounstine 2013). Recent surveys of the literature on 
the determinants of electoral participation point in a similar direction (Geys, 2006; Cancela 
and Geys, 2016; McDonnell, 2019).  
Here, we argue that it is possible to extend the theoretical reasoning of the size and 
participation literature to the empirical research on the political effects of amalgamations. 
Three streams of literature point to a negative impact of amalgamations on electoral 
participation, whereas a small number of theoretical arguments suggests a positive impact. 
The remainder of this section explores the theoretical foundations of the negative relationship 
based on the three streams of the literature: 1) the rational voter model; 2) the social trust and 
cohesion model; and 3) the political protest and local identity literature. The section ends 
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with the theoretical rationale for a positive relationship between amalgamations and voter 
turnout. 
The Rational Voter Model 
Rational voters aim to influence the outcome of the election by weighting the costs and 
benefits of voting (Downs 1957). The benefits increase significantly in small-scale elections 
and this increases the probability of affecting the outcome of the election (Riker and 
Ordeshook 1968). Geys argues that “the greater the size of the community, the smaller the 
probability becomes that one single voter will make a difference. This decreases the expected 
utility from voting and makes it more likely that one abstains.” (2006: 642). Thus, it can be 
expected that voter turnout will be higher when elections are too close to call and a few votes 
can make a difference. In this context, voters have more opportunity to influence the outcome 
of an election and citizens will have more contact with their elected officials (Hajnal and 
Lewis, 2003; Wood 2002).  
Amalgamation reforms increase the average size of amalgamated jurisdictions, decreasing 
the probability of casting the decisive vote. The worsening of the ratio of elected 
representatives to the number of voters caused by municipal amalgamations has also been 
negatively associated with public participation in local affairs (CoE, 1995; Chorianopoulos, 
2011). The meta-analysis of 83 studies conducted by Benny Geys (2006) finds empirical 
support for the rational voter model, stating that the inclusion of population size measures in 
the analyses of the determinants of voter turnout is suggested by the probability of casting 
the decisive vote in the election. 
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Social Trust and Political Embeddedness Model 
A second stream of literature suggests that amalgamations may affect the levels of social 
trust and citizen engagement in the political life of the community. Early sociologists argued 
that larger communities experience a significant shift in social relationships that prevents 
each individual in the community from knowing all others personally (Simmel, 1903; Wirth, 
1938). The increased number of citizens per jurisdiction is likely to affect collective action 
as well, resulting in lower engagement in political activities, including turnout. The increased 
heterogeneity of urban life described in these early works is similar to the effects of municipal 
mergers, which have been associated with declining community attachment (Kushner and 
Siegel, 2003; Swianiewicz, 2002) and lower levels of social trust and cohesion, (Denters et 
al. 2014; Oliver, 2001). Amalgamations may also increase dissatisfaction with government 
among citizen-voters and lead to decreased participation in local elections (Hansen, 2015). 
While these changes are based on citizen perceptions and impressions, other effects of 
municipal amalgamations are factual. The sudden shift in size of merged jurisdictions 
effectively reduces the number of representatives per voter (Horiuchi et al., 2015) and 
increases the political distance between voters and elected officials (Dahl and Tufte, 1973; 
Denters et al., 2014; Newton, 1982; Roesel, 2017). By increasing the size of municipalities, 
amalgamation reforms may generate a biased representation since elected officials will be 
serving only a small segment of the residents (Hajnal and Lewis, 2003). All these negative 
effects – be they perceived or factual – affect social cohesion and citizen engagement in 
politics and are likely associated with lower levels of voter turnout. 
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Political Protest and Local Identity 
Stable municipal borders help to create a strong sense of local identity (Stoker, 2011), which 
may feel under attack when facing an externally-imposed reform. Besides public 
demonstrations against the reform, one of the most obvious ways to express disagreement 
under duress is to abstain from voting (Hanna, 2009). While electoral boycotts are rare 
events, particularly in democratic states, it is certainly possible that some citizens choose to 
stay home as a form of protest against a territorial reform. 
Amalgamation reforms are politically controversial endeavors and have been described by 
local actors as “an attack on our self-respect” (Zeedan, 2017: 716), generating “a much larger 
bureaucracy” (Fathimath, 2017: 228) or increasing the distance between citizens and their 
representatives (Chorianopoulos, 2011; Denters et al., 2014). In countries with a long history 
of local government, municipal territorial stability and absence of prior experiences of 
amalgamations, local autonomy may often feel threatened by territorial reforms initiated 
from the top (Teles, 2016).  
In the particular case of SMUs in Portugal, the long-standing tradition suggests the possibility 
of extending this reasoning from the municipal to the sub-municipal level. After the Liberal 
Revolution of 1820, centuries-old Catholic parishes were converted into civil parishes as a 
result of a laicization process and established by law in 1836. By 1960, the number of civil 
parishes (SMUs) was 3,702 and their number reached a high of 4,260 in 2010 (PORDATA, 
2019). The combination of a strong neighborhood identity and the absence of exogenous 
shocks resulted in the lock in of SMUs as institutional arrangements and their persistence for 
more than a century (Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson, 2008; Pierson, 2000a, 2000b). These 
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conditions suggest that the expected negative effects of amalgamations on turnout are not 
exclusive of the municipal level and may, in fact, carry over to the sub-municipal one.  
Size and Mobilization 
The theoretical arguments supporting a positive association between amalgamations and 
voter turnout are scarce and focus primarily on the idea that, in larger cities, community 
interests, political parties, and the media tend to be far better organized than in small 
jurisdictions and this may lead to an increased attention and mobilization of voters (Newton, 
1982). The ability of larger local governments to provide more services to their citizens can 
also increase participation in local politics (Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Swianiewicz, 2010). In 
turn, this diversity and political competition in larger jurisdictions can potentially improve 
the responsiveness of elected officials to their constituents and contribute to mobilize voters 
(Denters et al., 2014). Prior amalgamation reforms have relied on the idea that larger 
territorial units are able to undertake a wider range of activities, thereby stimulating public 
participation on local politics (Hlepas, 2018). Others have argued that larger jurisdictions are 
more heterogeneous and diverse in terms of policy preferences and positions regarding social 
and political issues, which lead to increased political conflict, more intense competition in 
local politics and, ultimately, higher voter turnout levels (Kelleher and Lowery, 2004).  
In contrast with the abundant empirical literature corroborating the negative effect of 
amalgamations on local democracy (Swianiewicz, 2018; Tavares, 2018), there is 
significantly less evidence that amalgamations have positive political effects, particularly 
when it comes to the levels of voter turnout. In fact, a recent review of 22 studies, reporting 
37 tests of the link between municipal size and turnout, finds one single positive association, 
which contrasts with 26 negative effects and 10 tests reporting no statistically significant 
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relationship (McDonnell, 2019). The following section reviews the literature on the effects 
of amalgamation reforms on democratic outcomes with a special emphasis on voter turnout. 
Empirical Evidence of the Political Effects of Amalgamations 
Most amalgamation reforms have been motivated by arguments related to economies of scale 
and cost savings and far less attention has been paid to the long-term consequences of the 
reforms to the quality of local democracies. Political rhetoric by central government officials 
overstates the positive effects of amalgamations on costs and agendas favoring centralization 
are actively pursued by international organizations, such as the European Commission and 
the International Monetary Fund. This optimism regarding the economic consequences is in 
stark contrast with the democratic outcomes of territorial reforms. The analysis of the 
empirical literature suggests that the political effects of amalgamations are generally 
negative, regardless of the specific type of consequences scholars have investigated (Tavares, 
2018).  
The number of studies investigating the effect of municipal amalgamations on voter turnout 
is still small, but has grown in recent years. Early work by Mabuchi (2001) using descriptive 
election data of postwar amalgamations in Japan finds that voter turnout is not significantly 
affected by amalgamations. However, the author does not employ multivariate analysis, so 
these results are not robust. 
Recent empirical studies are more sophisticated in their treatment of the causal link between 
municipal amalgamations and voter turnout. Horiuchi et al. (2015) investigate the impact of 
Japan’s municipal mergers in the early 2000s and find a substantial reduction in turnout at 
the national level. Using a mixed-methods approach, van Houwelingen (2017) finds a 
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decrease in electoral participation in the Netherlands as the outcome of municipal mergers. 
Roesel (2017) employs the synthetic control method to investigate the political effects of 
district amalgamations in the Germany state of Saxony. The amalgamation reduced the 
number of districts from 22 to 10 and resulted in the increase of average district population 
from 113,000 to 290,000 residents. The author finds that the reform resulted in a decrease in 
the number of candidates and voter turnout in district elections. Similarly, a study by Zeedan 
(2017) explores the consequences of a 2003 amalgamation reform of 24 municipalities in 
Israel. The 11 amalgamated municipalities resulting from the reform display voter turnout 
levels between 75% and 90% lower than before the amalgamation.  
Koch and Rochat (2017) employ OLS panel fixed-effects regression to study the impacts of 
three ‘waves’ of amalgamations in the Swiss Canton of Ticino and find significant decreases 
in turnout, especially in the first election after the first ‘wave’ of amalgamations. The authors 
also find that differences in turnout increase with the passage of time for the first ‘wave’ of 
mergers, but the third ‘wave’ experienced the lowest reduction in turnout levels. This 
underlines the importance of studying the effects of mergers in the long run rather than simply 
looking at the effect in the first election after the reform. Heinisch et al. (2018) underline the 
negative effect of mergers on citizen engagement and information about the elections in their 
study of the 2015 amalgamation reform in the Austrian state of Styria. The authors argue that 
mergers have reduced opportunities for contacting local elected officials or influencing 
policy decisions, which resulted in a drop in voter turnout of about 1.29 percentage points. 
Lapointe et al. (2018) investigate the effects of a series of amalgamations in Finland in 2009 
and find a reduction of 4 percentage points in voter turnout in the smaller amalgamated 
municipalities and no effect for the largest municipalities involved in mergers. The authors 
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attribute the negative effects on turnout to the significant decreases in voters’ perceived 
political efficacy. 
Besides the studies addressing the effect of municipal mergers on voter turnout, another 
group of studies, mainly from Denmark, which concentrates on other political consequences, 
including negative impacts on political efficacy (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Gendźwill and 
Swianiewicz, 2016), political representation (Kjaer et al. 2010; Jakobsen and Kjaer 2016; 
Zeedan 2017), support for incumbents after the merger Kjaer and Klemmensen 2015), split-
ticket voting (Elklit and Kjaer 2009), and vote shares for populist parties (Roesel 2017). All 
these empirical results are consistency with the theoretical argument that mergers can have 
negative effects in other aspect of democracy that result in diminished electoral participation 
by citizens. In other words, lower (internal and external) political efficacy, decline of trust in 
government and/or reductions in local political interest are mediators between merger effects 
and voter turnout (Koch and Rochat, 2017; Lapointe et al., 2018). 
Table 1 displays a summary of the empirical studies addressing the political consequences of 
municipal amalgamations. For the most part, these studies find negative impacts on most 
political dimensions, including, but not limited to, voter turnout, internal political efficacy, 
and local representative democracy. The next section presents the research setting and the 
hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analyses. These hypotheses are derived from the 
extant literature and adapted to the specific context of the territorial reform of SMUs of 
government in Portugal. 
[insert Table 1] 
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Research Context and Hypotheses 
The Portuguese Constitution recognizes civil parishes3 (freguesias) as the smallest unit of 
local government (article 238). Parishes are sub-municipal units of self-government 
composed by an elected assembly (deliberative body) and an executive council (junta de 
freguesia) and each parish is an integral part of the municipality which contains it (see 
Tavares and Teles, 2018 for an in-depth description). Each municipality can be divided into 
several parishes, each resembling a form of neighborhood government similar to what one 
can find in Germany (Kersting and Kuhlmann, 2018), Greece (Hlepas, 2018), Poland 
(Swianiewicz, 2014; 2018), Scandinavia (Bäck et al., 2005; Klausen, 2018), and Spain 
(Navarro and Pano, 2018). Nevertheless, the historical roots, long-standing tradition, and 
constitutional status of Portuguese parishes renders them a privileged status in terms of 
democratic legitimacy and service provision units. International comparisons are particularly 
difficult because SMUs in other European countries do not cover the totality of the national 
territories, tend to be created primarily in urban areas as neighborhood governments (but, see 
Peteri (2008) for exceptions), derive political legitimacy from a variety of sources, and 
display significant institutional diversity (Bäck et al., 2005; Horak and Blokland, 2012; 
Schaap and Daemen, 2012; see Hlepas et al., 2018 for a comprehensive review). If anything, 
Portuguese SMUs are primarily ‘neighborhood governments’ in the sense described by 
Lowndes and Sullivan (2008). While they can and do fulfill civic, social, and economic roles, 
SMUs are, first and foremost, governments with a political function. Their existence, 
 
3 We employ the term Sub-Municipal Unit (SMU) of local government to designate a subnational government 
tier below the municipality. In Portugal, this tier is known as a freguesia, which can be loosely translated as 
parish or civil parish. 
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tradition, and stability embody citizens’ feelings of place attachment and local identity. Given 
this political representation function and the presence of political institutions which mirror 
their municipal government counterparts (executive and deliberative bodies), it can be argued 
that the theoretical reasoning and empirical studies on the effects of amalgamations at the 
municipal level can be extended and replicated at the SMU level.  
Portuguese parishes cover the entirety of the country’s land area. They are classified by law 
according to three types, depending on the degree of urbanization: 1) Urban parishes – 
population density above 500 people per square kilometer or at least one neighborhood with 
5,000 inhabitants or more; 2) Semi-urban parishes – with population density above 100 
people per square kilometer, or a neighborhood above 2,000 and below 5,000 inhabitants; 
and 3) Rural parishes – all the others. 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2011 by the Portuguese Government 
placed the country under financial assistance of the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Union and the European Central Bank. The MoU required a territorial reform of 
Portugal’s local government system, which at the time was structured in two tiers, including 
308 municipalities and 4251 civil parishes (SMUs). The main argument present in the MoU 
was that excessive territorial fragmentation caused economic inefficiencies, excessive 
administrative costs, and deficient service delivery (Tavares and Rodrigues, 2015). In 2013, 
the Portuguese national government enacted a territorial reform to merge SMUs and decided 
to leave untouched the territories of the municipalities. 
Sixty-one municipalities adopted voluntary mergers of their SMUs in compliance with the 
national framework, whereas 168 municipalities were forced to accept top-down 
amalgamations of SMUs imposed by the Technical Unit of Territorial Administrative 
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Reform (UTRAT) established by the national government to manage the reform (Tavares 
and Teles, 2018). The remaining 49 municipalities in Continental Portugal were not affected 
by the reform. The reform was implemented in the beginning of 2013 so the local elections 
in October took place under the new territorial organization of SMUs.  
Tables 2 and 3 present the number of SMUs per number of registered voters and per area, 
respectively, before and after the reform. Both tables indicate important changes in the 
territorial landscape of SMUs. According to Table 2, all categories of population have lower 
absolute numbers of SMUs, except the one above 20,000 inhabitants. The category below 
150 residents is now residual (only seven SMUs), with the categories between 150 and 1,000 
and between 1,000 and 5,000 remaining the most frequent. More importantly, the reform 
resulted in larger SMUs on average, but only about 13% of SMUs are above 5,000 residents, 
which clearly indicates that SMUs retain their neighborhood government character, even 
after a substantial change. The information on Table 3 confirms this idea, since the majority 
of parishes (approximately 87%) displays an area under 50 square kilometers4.   
 
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
 
4 In the appendix, we included a table showing SMUs in comparative perspective with municipalities in 
selected countries. In terms of area, Portuguese SMUs are approximately the size of Hungarian municipalities, 
slightly smaller than Austrian municipalities, and much larger than the highly fragmented landscape of local 
governments in France and the Czech Republic. After the reform, the average SMU is close to the average 
Austrian municipality and, on average, much larger than the French or the Czech municipalities. In Portugal, 
the average SMU is about one tenth of the size of the average municipality, both in terms of area and 
population. 
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The territorial reform was unpopular to all participants in the local government system, 
particularly at the SMUs level. The Associação Nacional de Freguesias (ANAFRE), a 
national association representing all parishes, organized demonstrations against the territorial 
reform and the President of the Association lobbied the President of Portugal, at that time, – 
Aníbal Cavaco Silva – not to enact the legal diploma of the reform5.  
Given the voices of dissent and the unpopularity of the reform, reductions in voter turnout 
levels were to be expected. However, the motivations for these reductions are hard to 
disentangle. First, consistently with the rational voter model (Downs, 1957), the 
amalgamation process increased the size of amalgamated SMUs, reducing the probability 
that the vote cast will make a difference in the outcome of the election. Second, in line with 
prior work by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) and Hansen (2013, 2015), the reform has led 
critics to express concerns about increased distance between citizens and elected officials in 
the newly merged SMUs and possible lack of responsiveness as a result (see footnote 4). 
Lastly, the perception that the merger was largely a top-down initiative led to popular 
protests and accusations of it being an attempt to destroy local identity and self-government 
(Teles, 2016). Hence, we expected that:   
 
H1: The reduction in turnout in the 2013 election was more significant in 
amalgamated SMUs than in non-amalgamated ones. 
 
 
5 See, for example, https://www.dn.pt/portugal/interior/freguesias-pedem-a-cavaco-para-chumbar-reforma-
2961832.html  and https://www.correiodominho.pt/noticias/freguesias-unidas-contra-a-reforma/60017  
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After the initial negative impact of the reform in the 2013 election cycle, we expect some 
recovery in voter turnout in the 2017 elections. The first election after an amalgamation 
reform tends to generate important information costs for voters, who are still adjusting to the 
changes in population, territory, relevant policy issues, and a potentially larger pool of 
candidates (Kraaykamp et al., 2001). In line with these ideas, recent work by Koch and 
Rochat (2017) finds significant reductions in turnout in the first election after the first ‘wave’ 
of amalgamations. The level of protest against the reform is expected to subside as the new 
territory of the amalgamated SMU becomes consolidated, and the amalgamated governments 
became institutionalized. Also, many local government officials at the SMU level expected 
the new national government, with a different ideological stance of the one enacting the 
reform, to revert the previous reform, at least partially. Nevertheless, we expect that some 
negative effect on turnout to remain in the amalgamated SMUs, which is also consistent with 
the findings of Koch and Rochat (2017): 
 H2: In the 2017 election cycle, turnout recovered more significantly in non-
amalgamated SMUs than in amalgamated ones.  
The next section describes the data and methods employed in the empirical analysis. 
Empirical Analysis  
Data 
Prior empirical work has focused primarily on voter turnout differences between jurisdictions 
of different sizes, in a given period in time, or variation in turnout before-and-after 
amalgamation reforms (Denters, et.al, 2014; Hansen, 2013). In this article, we seek to 
introduce a more dynamic approach, in line with most recent trends in research on 
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amalgamations (Koch and Rochat, 2017; Lapointe et al., 2018), by analyzing parish assembly 
turnout in five elections spanning a period of 16 years (2001-2017), including the 
implementation of a territorial reform in the 2013 election. Hence, rather than testing the 
correlation between size and turnout, we follow the logic of experimental methods by 
comparing the behavior of subjects randomly assigned to a treatment – the territorial reform 
– and divided between the treated group – amalgamated SMUs – and the control group – 
non-amalgamated SMUs.  
We opted to divide our analysis in three distinctive periods: (1) 2001-2009; (2) 2009-2013; 
(3) 2013-2017. For the first period, we gathered information on turnout in parish elections in 
2001, 2005, and 2009. This is the period before the territorial reform and we do not expect 
to see major differences in turnout levels between non-amalgamated and (to be) amalgamated 
SMUs. Any differences that might exist cannot be accounted for by the territorial reform and 
we expect to see a common pattern in turnout levels between the two groups. 
The second period focuses on the amalgamation process, i.e., the changes in turnout between 
the 2009 and the 2013 elections. The electoral cycle coincided with the effective 
implementation of the territorial reform. The 2013 elections were schedule to elect new 
officials in all SMUs, including the newly amalgamated ones. Regardless of the theoretical 
rationale, citizens had fewer incentives to vote in amalgamated SMUs. Hence, we expect to 
see a drop in turnout levels under these circumstances. 
The last period spans the 2013 and 2017 elections. The 2017 election was the second electoral 
moment after the 2013 territorial reform. We aim to investigate if the effect of 
amalgamations, along with the rationale that guided the decision to vote in 2013, still 
influences turnout or if the effect faded away with time.   
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Econometric model and estimation strategy  
To address the main objective of the paper, we follow a methodology able to assess the 
specific effect of a policy on the outcome of a group. In other words, we adopt a strategy that 
allows us to measure the effect of the territorial reform on the SMU turnout levels. The 
Differences-in-Differences (DiD) method allows us to assess changes in outcomes over time 
between a population affected by a reform and one that was not affected. As Blom-Hansen 
et.al. (2014) put it, the DiD estimates a combined effect of treatment and time by computing 
the changes in differences among treated and non-treated groups. Assuming that turnout in 
amalgamated SMU i is given by Yi1 we seek to compare it with the Yi0 which represents the 
level of turnout in non-amalgamated SMUs. The key aspect of the design is that SMUs cannot 
be, simultaneously, amalgamated and non-amalgamated. Hence, DiD compares 
amalgamated SMUs, taking non-amalgamated as the counterfactual, using two periods in 
time. The first difference is computed by the variation in the treated group before-and-after 
treatment (Yi1 T=1 - Yi1 T=0, where T represents time). The second differences result from the 
change in the control group before-and-after treatment and stands for the effect of time (Yi0 
T=1 - Yi0 T=0, where T represents time). The DiD estimation results from the subtraction of the 
first by the second difference and reflects the effect of the treatment on the treated group ((Yi1 
T=1 - Yi1 T=0) - (Yi0 T=1 - Yi0 T=0))6.  
 
6 We could use propensity score matching as an alternative estimation strategy. This method is 
employed to compare the effects of a policy or program on a group by building an artificial 
comparison group. This comparison is computed through propensity scores that match units from the 
treatment group with others from the untreated group, relying on observed characteristics that are not 
affected by the treatment (Gertler et. al, 2011). The method is useful to assess the post-treatment 
effect, since it compares the differences in outcomes between the enrolled units and their matched 
units. The estimations and results are consistent with the DiD results. Since we have available data 
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By establishing the differences between the treated and untreated groups, before-and-after 
the territorial reform, it is possible to assess the outcome (turnout levels) by using the 
following expression: 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
  (1) 
The 𝛽2 coefficient estimates the differences in turnout between treated and untreated groups 
before the reform. The 𝛽3 coefficient provides information on the changes in turnout levels 
that cannot be accounted for by the treatment (the territorial reform). The 𝛽4 coefficient 
provides the estimation of the main variable of interest, i.e., the average effect of the 
treatment on the amalgamated group. Thus, it provides the estimation of the effect on turnout 
induced by the territorial reform, taking as counterfactual the turnout levels recorded by 
parishes unaffected by the territorial reform. Additionally, we added a control variable 
(𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡) which typifies the nature of the SMU. It takes the value ‘1’ if the SMU is classified 
as urban and ‘0’ otherwise.  The 𝛽5 coefficient provides information about the difference in 
turnout between urban and non-urban SMUs. Prior findings in the Portuguese context 
indicate that urban and more populated SMUs will display lower turnout levels (Tavares and 
Raudla, 2018). We build three estimations corresponding to the three periods of interest. 
In Equation 1 the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 is computed as a dummy variable that takes value 1 
to identify treated SMUs and 0 otherwise. The variable 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is also a dummy variable 
used to distinguish different electoral years in the three periods of interest. The years depend 
 
from the SMU elections, we chose a DiD estimation to display and analyze the trend in turnout 
between enrolled and not enrolled units. 
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and vary as a function of the models being analyzed (2001-2009; 2009-2013; 2013-2017). 
That is, the variable assumes the value ‘0’ for the first year and ‘1’ for the last year in each 
period of analysis.  
Results 
Figure 1 displays descriptive data of voter turnout levels in SMU elections during the period 
of 2001-2017. There is a tendency for a decrease in voter turnout in SMU elections, starting 
in 2005 and reaching a low point in 2013, whether we are considering amalgamated or non-
amalgamated SMUs. This is followed by a small recovery in the 2017 election. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
However, the trend before the territorial reform is not the same as the one recorded after it. 
One of the main concerns in analyzing the effects of the territorial reform on voter turnout in 
2013 and 2017 is to validate the results from the DiD method to ensure that the differences 
encountered are the result of the treatment and not the consequence of a previous trend. 
Figure 1 indicates a similar turnout pattern for (soon-to-be) amalgamated and non-
amalgamated SMUs in the period before the reform. However, this common pattern changes 
in the 2013 election, providing visual confirmation of the differences identified in the DiD 
method. The analysis of the trend allows us to dispel possible endogeneity problems. The 
trend is very similar for both groups of SMUs before the territorial reform (2001-2009), but 
substantially divergent after it (2013 and 2017). This dispels the idea that the groups could 
already record divergent levels of turnout prior to the reform. It also provides more 
confidence in the argument that the territorial reform has a negative effect on voter turnout 
levels in amalgamated SMUs.  
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Table 4 presents the results of the DiD model. The amalgamation process had a negative 
effect on the levels of electoral participation in amalgamated SMUs. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Before the reform, differences in turnout between the treated and untreated groups are not 
statistically significant, as evidenced by the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 coefficient in the first 
column (Model 1 - 2001-2009). With the treatment – the 2013 territorial reform – the 
amalgamated SMUs recorded a higher drop in turnout than they would have experienced in 
the absence of the treatment. The term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 displays a value of -1.242, which 
represents the average reduction in turnout that can be accounted for by the effect of the 
territorial reform. Before the amalgamations, the treated group recorded a level of voter 
turnout of 64.813%. Following the DiD method rationale, in 2013, an average drop of 3.411 
percentage points was expected, simply as a result of the continuing decline in voter turnout. 
Instead, the amalgamated group registered an extra average drop (1.242 more than the non-
amalgamated SMUs, as evidence by the 𝛽4 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2 − 2009 − 2013). This finding 
supports the first hypothesis, indicating that the territorial reform resulted in a lower turnout 
for amalgamated parishes of -4.653 percentage points (=-3.411 - 1.242). In contrast, non-
amalgamated SMUs recorded a smoother drop in turnout of 3.41 percentage points 
(𝛽3 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2 − 2009 − 2013). The magnitude of the effect of the Portuguese reform is 
quite similar to the drop in turnout registered in the Austrian state of Styria as reported by 
Heinisch et al. (2018) (1.29 percentage points). 
Participation grew in the 2017 election, both in amalgamated and non-amalgamated SMUs. 
This result is in line with our second hypothesis, since it was expected that the effect of the 
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protest vote would fade away with time. Still, differences in turnout between the two groups 
are visually and statistically discernible. Again, due to the territorial reform, the treated group 
recorded a lower increment in turnout than it would have had if these SMUs had not been 
subjected to the treatment. The term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 displays a value of -0.903 
(𝛽4 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 3 − 2013 − 2017), which represents the average difference in turnout 
between merged and non-merged SMUs that can be accounted for by the territorial reform. 
In 2013, the treated group recorded a level of voter turnout of 60.264%. Following the 
estimation of the term 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡, an increment of 1.644 percentage points (𝛽3 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 3) was 
expected for the 2017 election. Instead, the average increment for the merged group was 
lower by -0.903 percentage points than the average increment in turnout for the control group 
(1.644). In line with the findings for the 2013 election, the territorial reform caused a smaller 
increase in turnout in amalgamated SMUs. This finding confirms the second hypothesis, 
indicating that the recovery in voter turnout levels was less evident in amalgamated SMUs. 
The average pace of recovery in merged municipalities was 0.741 percentage point (=1.644 
- 0.903). These findings are consistent with prior results indicating a substantial negative 
impact on the first election after the reform that tends to be less pronounced after in the 
second election (Koch and Rochat, 2017). 
The results of the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 support the argument of the negative impact of the 
territorial reform on the turnout of SMUs. The coefficient indicates the initial differences in 
voter turnout between merged and non-merged SMUs. It fails to achieve statistical 
significance in both models 1 and 2, showing no relevant differences between the two groups 
before the territorial reform. This result also serves as a robustness check for possible 
endogeneity, suggesting that there were no differences in turnout between the two groups 
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before the reform. In model 3, after the territorial reform, the result already displays a relevant 
difference among groups. 
The results for the control variable have, as expected, a negative impact on the level of voter 
turnout. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant for all periods, indicating that 
urban SMUs experience the lower turnout rates, thus confirming prior findings in the 
Portuguese setting (Tavares and Raudla, 2018). 
In sum, the results from the DiD method confirm H1, and H2. The territorial reform reduced 
turnout levels in amalgamated SMUs compared to non-amalgamated SMUs. In the first 
election after the reform, merged municipalities experienced a significantly lower turnout 
than previous elections. In the following election, turnout recovered, but, again, this recovery 
was more substantial in non-amalgamated SMUs than in amalgamated ones. 
Conclusion 
The goal of this research is to cast new light on the political costs of territorial reforms. We 
investigated this important research question by focusing on the heretofore neglected 
amalgamation reform of SMUs in Portugal. Our results indicate that the amalgamation 
process had a negative effect on voter turnout. Hence, a territorial reform motived by 
economic factors and triggered by a situation of financial distress, resulted in negative 
democratic outcomes translated into lower electoral participation levels. 
In our theoretical section, we posited three causal mechanisms that could potentially explain 
the negative effect of amalgamations on voter turnout: rational voting, declining social 
cohesion and trust, and perceived loss of local identity. Our goal was not to identify which 
of these mechanisms was specifically responsible for the decline in turnout in the case of the 
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Portuguese reform, but rather to assess whether this negative effect occurred and, if so, its 
magnitude. The results confirm our hypotheses regarding the negative effect of 
amalgamations on turnout and counter the view that increased size through amalgamations 
might work as a trigger for the mobilization of electoral participation.   
Under the lenses of the Downsian model, the amalgamation process is likely to reduce the 
relevance of the act of voting by diminishing the probability that an individual casts the 
decisive vote (Downs, 1957). Similarly, the social trust model suggests that the 
socioeconomic status, particularly social cohesion, is altered through the process of 
amalgamation, thus hindering political engagement expressed through voter turnout 
(Swianiewicz, 2002; Denters et al., 2014). The significant reduction of turnout in 
amalgamated SMUs in the first election after the reform combined with the recovery of 
turnout in the second election also may support the idea of a short-term abstention as a form 
of political protest against the reform.  
Our results regarding turnout in the 2013 election are consistent with the arguments of the 
rational voter, the social cohesion, and the political protest explanations, but we are unable 
to disentangle which theoretical mechanism has the strongest role in causing the observed 
effects on voter turnout levels. In addition, it is also possible that the financial crisis and the 
2011 bailout contributed to the migration of voting age population and to a decline in voter 
confidence in Portugal, resulting in lower turnout rates in the 2013 election. We have no 
means to untangle these effects in our analyses, and it is also impossible to show whether this 
crisis effect had disappeared by 20177. Citizen survey data could have helped to tease out the 
 
7 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility. 
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magnitude of these effects, but to our knowledge no such data was collected for Portugal, so 
these stimulating research questions will remain unanswered in the foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, we argue that the effect of amalgamations on voter turnout is more complex 
than previously thought. The 2017 turnout levels in amalgamated parishes is higher compared 
to 2013, but the difference between amalgamated and non-amalgamated SMUs is still 
increasing. This suggests that amalgamation reforms are ‘a gift that keeps on giving’, with 
their negative effects lingering for a long time after they have been institutionalized. This is 
also consistent with the idea that the incentives to vote may be permanently reduced for 
residents in amalgamated SMUs. 
The results of these analyses suggest two different avenues for future research. The first 
possibility is to focus only on the amalgamated SMUs and analyze how their heterogeneity 
before amalgamation has impacted voter turnout. The process of creation of amalgamated 
SMUs agglomerated SMUs of different sizes and voter turnout levels. A relevant contribution 
to the field should analyze how the amplitude of sizes and prior levels of turnout has 
conditioned the levels of turnout in the newly amalgamated SMUs. The second idea to 
explore in future research is to concentrate on other democratic outcomes. Due to limited 
data availability, our research was primarily interested in voter turnout as a political 
participation variable. However, territorial reforms affect democratic performance at many 
levels, including political efficacy, political representation, and support for the incumbents 
at the municipal level. These political consequences are relevant topics of research, ripe to 
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Table 1 – The Political Effects of Municipal Amalgamations 
Author(s) Date Journal Country Data Methods Findings 
Elklit and 
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Inter-level split-ticket voting between 
three levels (national, regional and 
local) decreased slightly from 2001 to 
2005 – that is, simultaneously with the 
implementation of a major reform, 
where many municipalities and all the 
counties were amalgamated. These 
amalgamations affect the level of split 
voting through a process where the 
local party system operates as an 
intervening variable: the larger 
municipalities have a more 
nationalized local party system, which 
leads to fewer voters being vote 









merged into 287 
(2015) 
OLS regression 
Electoral turnout in merged 
municipalities decreased 1.29 




2015 JEAS Japan 
1,826 municipalities, 
557 of which were 
merger. Vote share 
of governing parties 
and voter turnout in 
upper house election. 
Difference-in-
differences 
Merged municipalities display 
significantly lower voter turnout 
Jakobsen and 
Kjaer 














Over-representation of the periphery in 
the legislature of amalgamated 
municipalities, both in terms of 
representation by seats (descriptive 
representation) and representation of 












Local parties of mayors were punished 
at the polls for implementing 
municipal amalgamations decided by 
the central government. Political 
parties holding the mayoralty in times 
of amalgamations tend to nominate 
very tenured mayors as candidates, 
thereby missing the positive first-term 
incumbency effect, which a new 
mayor could have acquired. Voters 
tend to reward primarily the success in 
providing high quality local services, 
not punish the costs of centrally-
mandated amalgamation reforms. 
Kjaer et al. 2010 LGS Denmark 
Two large surveys: 
pre-reform survey 
(2003, 844 
respondents, 61% of 







Amalgamations have led to an increase 
in the perceived influence of leading 
councilors vis-à-vis other councilors 
and a decrease in the perceived 
influence of the council vis-a`-vis its 




respondents, 53% of 
total councilors) 
increase in the number of councilors 
who find that local political decisions 
are determined by laws and rules from 
central government, but this increase 










and 147 post-merger 
municipalities (2012) 
in three merger 
‘waves’ 
OLS panel fixed 
effects 
regression 
Turnout decreases more significantly 
in merged municipalities, particularly 





2018 LGS Finland 
61 municipalities. 










Municipal mergers decrease voter 
turnout by 4 percentage points in small 
municipalities compared to similar 
municipalities that did not merge. No 




2011 APSR Denmark 
Survey data collected 
before (963 
respondents) and 






Jurisdiction size has a causal and 
sizeable detrimental effect on citizens’ 









Voter turnout is not significantly 
affected by amalgamations. 
Roesel 2017 EJPE 
Germany 
(Saxony) 
22 county-sized local 
governments merged 





Evidence that mergers decreased the 
number of candidates and voter turnout 
in district elections while vote shares 
for populist right-wing parties 
increased. 
Zeedan 2017 JUA Israel 
24 amalgamated 
governments, panel 






Amalgamation reduces local 
democracy in terms of voter turnout 
and representation. A new 
amalgamated government must be 
sufficiently small to maximize local 
democracy and sufficiently large to 
maximize economies of scale. 
Notes: APSR = American Political Science Review; EJPE = European Journal of Political Economy; JEAS = Journal of East Asian Studies; 






Table 2 – Sub-Municipal Units per number of registered voters 
Note: An average of 2,483 inhabitants per parish before the reform and an average of 3,414 inhabitants after the 
2013 Reform. The average number of inhabitants in the 308 Portuguese municipalities is 34,273. 
Source: DGAL – Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais (2003, 2014) 
Table 3 – Sub-Municipal Units per area in square kilometers 
Note: On average, each parish had 21.66 square kms. before 2013 and 29.78 square kms. after the 2013 Reform  
Source: DGAL – Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais (2003, 2014) 
SMU registered voters 
Before the reform 
(2013) 
After the reform (2013) 
 SMUs % SMUs % 
Less than 150 177 4.16 7 0.23 
Between 150 and 1,000 1,989 46.79 1405 45.44 
Between 1,000 and 5,000 1,637 38.51 1288 41.66 
Between 5,000 and 20,000 375 8.82 299 9.67 
More than 20,000  73 1.72 93 3.01 
Total number of SMUs 4,251 100 3092 100 
SMU area 
Before the reform 
(2013) 
After the reform 
 Parishes % Parishes % 
Less than 1 sq. km 70 1.65 2 0.06 
Between 1 and 5 sq. kms 943 22.18 378 12.23 
Between 5 and 10 sq. kms 931 21.90 581 18.79 
Between 10 and 50 sq. kms 1928 45.35 1719 55.60 
Between 50 and 100 sq. kms 226 5.32 248 8.02 
Between 100 and 200 sq. kms 123 2.89 118 3.82 
Between 200 and 400 sq. kms 29 0.68 42 1.36 
More than 400 sq. kms 1 0.02 4 0.13 
Total number of SMUs 4,251 100 3092 100 
 40 
 
Table 4 – Estimation Results of Difference-in-Differences 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 2001-2009 2009-2013 2013-2017 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 
(Initial difference among groups)  
-0.109 -0.144 -1.271*** 
(0.356) (0.378) (0.353) 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(Changes not accounted for by the treatment) 
-2.697*** -3.411*** 1.646*** 
(0.281) (0.291) (0.239) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 
(Average effect of the treatment on treated) 
-0.184 -1.242** -0.903* 
(0.501) (0.505) (0.497) 
𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(Control for the urban vs. non-urban SMUs) 
-4.458*** -5.505*** -6.446*** 
(0.277) (0.283) (0.282) 
𝑅2 0.06 0.10 0.09 
RMSE 8.01 9.121 9.203 
𝑁 5,734 5,892 6,040 

























(SMUs) 4 251 3 092 -1177 -27.57 21.73 29.94 2 470 3 416 
         









Austria 3 999 2 358 -1641 -41.04 20.97 35.56 3 560 3 552 
France 38 814 36 783 -2031 -5.23 14.21 15.00 1 636 1 707 
Czech Rep. 11 459 6 244 -5215 -45.51 6.88 12.63 1 641 1 683 
Hungary 3 032 3 152 +120 +3.96 30.68 29.51 3 153 3 177 
Portugal 303 308 +5 +0.02 303.87 298.94 35 491 34 538 
Note: Table includes the number of municipalities in selected countries in 1950 and 2007. Austria and the Czech 
Republic were included due to the large-scale amalgamation reforms during the 20th century; Austria, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic were included due to their similarities with Portugal, both in total area and population. All 
countries have highly fragmented local government systems, even though in the case of Portugal this level of 
fragmentation is manifested at the sub-municipal level.  
 
 
 
View publication stats
